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Abstract 
Using data on 17 listed public banks from Russia over the period 2008 to 2016, we analyze 
whether international oil prices affect the bank stability in an oil-dependent country. We posit 
that a decrease in international oil prices has a negative long-run macroeconomic impact for 
an oil-exporting country, which further deteriorates the bank financial stability. More 
specifically, a decrease in international oil prices leads for an oil-exporting country as Russia 
to a currency depreciation and to a deterioration of the fiscal stance. In addition, given the 
positive correlation of oil and stock prices documented by numerous previous studies, a 
decrease in international oil prices represents a negative signal for the stock markets investors, 
negatively affecting banks’ share prices and thus, their capacity to generate sustainable 
earnings. In this context, the bank financial stability can be menaced. With a focus on public 
listed banks and using a Pool Mean Group (PMG) estimator, we show that an increase in 
international oil prices and in the price to book value ratio has a long-run positive effect on 
Russian public banks stability, and conversely. While positive oil-price shocks contribute to 
bank stability in the long run, an opposite effect is recorded for negative shocks. However, no 
significant impact is documented in the short run. Our findings are robust to different bank 
stability specifications, different samples and control variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The banking sector stability was challenged by the recent financial global crisis all over 
the world. In the case of Russia, the threats to the bank stability were amplified by the conflict 
with the Ukraine and the economic sanctions imposed by the Western partners, which leaded 
to a severe depreciation of the Rubble. Since January 2014, the Russian ruble lost in two years 
around 50% of its value against the US dollar (Dreger et al., 2016). In addition, the plunge in 
global oil prices after 2014 put further strain on Russia (Tuzova and Qayum, 2016). In this 
context, the Russian economy, which is highly responsive to oil price fluctuations, recorded a 
negative dynamic, the investment and consumption contracted, and the volume of non-
performing loans (NPL) increased, putting thus pressure on the banking sector stability.  
After 2014, the Russian banking sector was confronted with a considerable growth in 
credit risks and bad loans, in the context of a severe deterioration of large borrowers’ financial 
condition, and of investors’ expectations.1 The largest share of non-performing loans was 
recorded in the construction sector, where foreign currency denominated loans prevailed. 
However, according to the Bank of Russia, the decline in international oil prices generated by 
an increased oil production at global level, and by the United States monetary policy 
tightening, put additional pressure on the Russian banking system.
2
 The oil and gas industry is 
of crucial importance for the Russian economy, representing more than 20% of GDP, about 
30% of fiscal revenues and more than 50% of exports (Simola and Solanko, 2017). Therefore, 
the impact of oil prices on the financial stability cannot be neglected. Our purpose is to test 
the short- and long-run influence of international oil prices on the bank stability in Russia. 
The literature addressing the bank stability determinants usually focuses on the role of 
bank competition (Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 
2010; Fernández et al., 2016), foreign ownership (Lee and Hsieh, 2014), shareholder 
diversification (García-Kuhnert et al., 2015), non-traditional banking activities (De Jonghe, 
2010; Wagner, 2010; Duport et al., 2018; Fina Katmani, 2018) and regulatory framework 
(Ahamed and Mallick, 2017). A recent strand of the literature (Miyajima, 2016; Khandelwal 
et al., 2016; Al-Khazali and Mirzaei, 2017; Lee and Lee, 2018) investigate the role of the 
international oil prices in influencing bank stability.
3
 We add to this narrow book of literature 
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 https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/8372/OFS_17-01_e.pdf 
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 While the effect of international oil prices on corporate financial performances is well documented in the 
literature (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008, 2011; Dayanandan and Donker, 2011), the impact on the bank 
financial stability is poorly investigated. 
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by assessing the impact of oil prices on the stability of listed Russian public banks over the 
period 2008 to 2016. 
Two different channels explain how oil prices affect the bank stability. The first one is 
the macroeconomic channel, which describes the link between oil prices and the 
macroeconomy, and how a degradation of macroeconomic conditions pass-through the 
banking sector performances. However, existing studies have examined this transmission 
channel without considering the different impact that oil prices may have on oil-exporting 
economies, as compared to oil-importing ones. For example, Kilian (2008) notes that oil price 
shocks negatively affect the consumption, and therefore the bank performances, through the 
uncertainty effect, precautionary savings effect, and the operating cost effect that lead to an 
increase of NPL. Nevertheless, in the case of an oil-exporting country, if oil prices increase at 
international level without recording a similar dynamic at national level, companies acting in 
the oil and gas industry, and the state, enregister higher revenues, with a positive effect on the 
banking sector (see for example Al-Khazali and Mirzaei, 2017). Therefore, the increase in 
international oil prices for oil-exporting countries does not necessary lead to higher 
production costs, reduction of purchasing power and economic growth contraction. On 
contrary, for oil-exporting countries a positive dynamic of oil prices might be associated with 
an increase of economic outcomes. In this case, banking performances improve (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Athanasoglou et al., 2008).  
Another element that should be considered inside the macroeconomic channel is the role 
of exchange rate. The link between oil prices and exchange rates is theoretically explained by 
Krugman (1983) and Golub (1983) who discuss the ‘wealth effect channel’, and by Amano 
and Van Norden (1998a, b), who describe the ‘terms of trade channel’. It is generally 
accepted that a decrease of international oil prices leads to a depreciation of oil-exporting 
countries’ currencies and vice-versa (Beckmann and Czudaj, 2013). In this line, a recent paper 
by Fedoseeva (2018) shows that the pass-through between oil prices and the Rubble exchange 
rate to US dollar substantially increased during the oil price collapse in 2014. Rubble’s 
depreciation generated a sharp increase in import prices with a positive impact on inflation, 
threatening thus the banking sector stability. Moreover, the Bank of Russia implemented an 
inflation targeting (IT) strategy (Korhonen and Nuutilainen, 2017) and the oil pass-through 
inflation is considered to be higher for the IT countries (López-Villavicencio and Pourroy, 
2019). 
Finally, oil and gas revenues are very important for the fiscal stance of an oil-exporting 
country. As Malova and Van der Ploeg (2017) point in the case of Russia, if the chunk of oil 
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and gas must be kept in the soil given the international agreements regarding global warming, 
or the lower level of international oil prices, the Russian fiscal stance needs to be tightened. In 
this case, the state may look for alternative financing sources and make appeal to public bank 
loans. Given the deterioration of the macroeconomic aggregates, a part of these loans may 
become non-performing, affecting thus the bank stability.  
A second, unexploited channel, throughout international oil prices affect the bank 
performance and stability is the financial market channel. An overwhelming number of 
studies address the nexus between oil and stock markets, most of them documenting a positive 
correlation. The recent paper by Huang et al. (2017) investigates the nonlinearities in this 
relationship and shows that Russian stock market positively responds to the oil prices across 
all time scales. In this context, it is very likely that a decrease in oil prices will be correlated 
with a decrease in the share value of listed companies, including in the share value of listed 
public banks. Therefore, on the one hand the price to book value decreases, and hence the 
capacity of banks to generate sustainable earnings (Yildirim and Efthyvoulou, 2018). On the 
other hand, bank expend their lending and generate more income when the stock prices 
increase and during economic boom periods (Hesse and Poghosyan, 2009). Conversely, when 
stock prices decrease, the credit activity shrinks and the profitability decreases.  
Against this background, we contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. 
First, we bring clarification to the oil price – bank stability relationship, making the 
distinction between the macroeconomic and financial market channel. At the same time, 
different from Lee and Lee (2018) who investigate the impact of oil prices on bank 
performances in China and document a negative relationship, we state that for an oil-
exporting country as Russia, the macroeconomic impact of an increase in international oil 
prices is positive, and therefore, the impact on bank performance might also be positive. In 
fact, very few studies have assessed the effects of oil price changes on the bank financial 
stability in oil-dependent countries (e.g. Miyajima, 2016; Khandelwal et al., 2016). Our 
theoretical assumptions are similar with those advanced by IMF (2015), Husain et al. (2015) 
and Al-Khazali and Mirzaei (2017) who state that oil prices downturns adversely affect 
businesses in oil-rich economies, and therefore, the quality of bank loans. However, different 
from these studies we exploit both the macroeconomic and financial channels throughout the 
international oil prices affect the bank stability in Russia. 
  Second, in line with other studies assessing the determinants of bank stability (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Jeon and Lim, 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2014; Kasman and Kasman, 2015) we 
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use the Z-score as proxy for the bank stability.
4
 However, different form previous works 
which mainly resort to the Boyd et al.’s (2006) approach to compute the Z-score, we also use 
an alternative measure, employing the Yeyati and Micco’s (2007) methodology, for 
robustness purpose. The Z-score is a risk measure commonly used in the empirical banking 
literature to reflect banks’ probability of insolvency and therefore, the level of bank stability. 
In addition, compared with the NPL ratio, data for Z-score computation is more accessible. 
Nevertheless, as Lepetit and Strobel (2013) show, there are several ways to compute the 
banking Z-score. Although there is a high correlation between these different metrics, the way 
the Z-score is computed may influence the empirical findings. 
Third, different from previous works assessing the bank stability determinants and 
usually resort to General Method of Moments (GMM) models, we employ a Pool Mean 
Group (PMG) estimator. On the one hand, most of our series prove to be I(1) which makes the 
result of GMM estimators inconsistent. On the other hand, PMG exploits the cross-sectional 
dimension to gain more precise estimates of average long-run parameters and deals with the 
omitted variable bias. Both the long- and the short-run relationship between bank stability, 
international oil prices and the price to book value are estimated. In the short-run relationship, 
we include a series of control variables that may affect the bank stability. We consider the 
bank performance dimension and we include the net interest margins and the bank size 
(following Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2011; Fina Katmani, 2018), the net operating cash 
flow (Beaver, 1968; Clark and Weinstein, 1983; Lanine and Vennet, 2006) and the liquidity 
rate (Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2018). We address the role of bank 
competition and regulation quality as in Beck et al. (2013), Jeon and Lim (2013) and Kasman 
and Kasman (2015). We also consider the macroeconomic context including the GDP growth 
rate (Lee and Lee, 2018) and the institutional context, considering the perception of 
corruption (like Weill, 2011). 
Forth, as far as we know this is the first study that investigates the role of shocks in 
international oil prices on the bank stability. Inspired by the studies of Hamilton (1996, 2003), 
Cong et al. (2008) and Babatunde et al. (2013), we compute both the positive and negative 
oil-price shocks and we test their impact on the bank stability. However, different from this 
works we propose an alternative approach, which allows to accommodate more shocks, and 
therefore to account for the effect of oil price volatility over a longer period. As in the case of 
reference methods, we use a rolling window to compute the shocks. Nevertheless, given our 
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 Data on NPL for public banks in Russia are in most of the cases unavailable. Therefore, the use of Z-scores 
represents a solution and a proxy for bank financial stability. 
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reduce time span (T = 9 for annual data) we compare the oil price level for a specific period 
with the average oil prices for the past periods, and not with their maximum/minimum values 
to identify positive/negative shocks.
5
 This way we are able to identify the dispersion of an oil 
price shock over multiple periods. Consequently, we do not consider an oil shock as a sudden 
increase/decrease in oil prices and associate it with only one period. Instead, depending on the 
shock intensity, we are able to see its effects in time, over multiple periods.   
Fifth, we focus on 17 listed public banks from Russia, using FactSet data from 2008 to 
2016 (annual data). There are several reasons for investigating the case of public banks sector. 
On the one hand, for Russia a decrease in international oil prices will first lead to a reduction 
of public exports, with a negative impact on the activity of public companies. Therefore, it is 
more likely that Russian public banks experience a deterioration of their financial 
performances and stability. On the other hand, different from other emerging markets 
economies, in Russia the market share of public banks is above 60% (Mamonov and 
Vernikov, 2017), which makes the public banks representative for the entire banking system. 
Finally, we consider the listed banks to test both the macroeconomic and the financial market 
channels throughout the oil prices influence the bank stability. The macroeconomic channel is 
more important for the public banks compared with the private ones, given the interaction 
between the public administration and public banks. 
The remaining of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on 
bank stability determinants. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 
shows the main empirical results while in Section 5 we present several robustness check 
analyses. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Bank stability determinants: brief literature review 
 
The literature assessing the determinants of bank stability is rather restrained. Most of 
the exiting works address the linkages between bank competition and financial stability. Two 
opposite views explain this relationship. First, the ‘competition-fragility’ theory states that an 
increased bank competition leads to a deterioration of bank stability (Keeley, 1990). 
According to this view, in a highly competitive environment, banks are determined to take 
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 Using a rolling window approach, Hamilton (2003) compares the oil price in the moment t with its maximum 
value over n previous periods to identify positive oil price shocks. Cong et al. (2008) compute both positive and 
negative oil price shocks but different from Hamilton, they identify oil price shocks by comparing the oil price in 
the moment t with its maximum/minimum values enregistered in all previous periods. Babatunde et al. (2013) 
combine these approaches and compute both positive and negative shocks, using in the same time a rolling 
window framework. 
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more risks. Second, the ‘competition-stability’ theory argues that an increased competition 
improves the bank stability as contributes to a reduction of the information asymmetry, and to 
a decrease of the loan default rates. The empirical studies found evidence in the favor of both 
theories, while Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) provided a reconciliation of these opposite 
views, documenting a U-shaped relationship between competition and bank stability. 
Recent empirical works on the subject continued, however, to report mixed findings. 
With a focus on Korean commercial banks and mutual savings banks, Jeon and Lim (2013) 
show that competition has a positive effect on the stability of mutual savings banks, a result in 
line with that reported by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). Comparable results are obtained by 
Kasman and Kasman (2015) for the Turkish banking industry over the period 2002–2012. 
They show that competition is negatively related to the NPL ratio, and positively related to 
the Z-score, supporting the view of the ‘competition-stability’ theory. Opposite findings are 
reported by Fungáčová and Weill (2013) for a large sample of Russian banks. For the period 
preceding the 2009 global crisis, the authors support the view that a tighter bank competition 
enhances the occurrence of bank failures. In the same line, Beck et al. (2013) posit that 
competition has a larger impact on banks’ fragility in highly regulated countries with 
developed stock markets.  
The structure of bank ownership and its impact on the bank stability represents another 
focus point for the empirical literature. In this case also, the mixed findings might be 
supported by two concurrent hypotheses, derived from the foreign direct investment literature. 
Berger et al. (2000) differentiate between the ‘global advantage’ and ‘home field advantage’ 
hypotheses. In the first case, the foreign banks that invest abroad might have competitive 
advantages relative to their domestically-owned peers. These advantages include risk 
management skills and access to funds, fostering therefore their stability. The ‘home field 
advantage hypothesis’ affirm the opposite, showing that domestic banks are familiarized with 
the economic and institutional context, and this way can improve their financial performance.  
The recent study by Lee and Hsieh (2014) conducted for 1,387 individual banks in 27 selected 
Asian countries, covering the period 1995–2009, empirically investigate the relation between 
bank-level foreign ownership and stability. Relying on a GMM framework, the authors show 
mixed evidence. An inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership and stability 
is documented. 
A new strand of literature emerged during the last years, investigating the role of oil 
prices in explaining the bank stability. Building upon Husain et al. (2015), Al-Khazali and 
Mirzaei (2017) verify whether oil prices shocks have any impact on NPL ratio for 2,310 
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commercial banks in 30 oil-exporting countries over the period 2000–2014. The authors resort 
to a dynamic GMM model and show that a rise (fall) in international oil prices is associated 
with a decrease (increase) in NPL ratio. At the same time, the unfavorable impact of adverse 
oil prices dynamics on the quality of bank loans is more pronounced in the case of large 
banks. For a set of banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Ibrahim (2019) 
underlines the favorable effects of positive oil price changes on bank profitability and credit 
growth, while underling the negative impact on NPL. Opposite results are reported by Lee 
and Lee (2018) for the Chinese banking sector. The authors assess bank performance through 
a broad array of CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and 
Liquidity) indicators, and discuss whether the correlations between oil prices and banks 
stability change with different dimensions of country risk. Their results reveal that oil prices 
negatively affect the bank performance. Adetutu et al. (2019) for Kazakhstan report a similar 
result and show that oil price booms negatively influence the banks’ total productivity. 
Different from these works, we exploit both the macroeconomic and the financial 
market channels to see how oil prices and bank valuation affect the level of bank stability. In 
addition, we assess the bank stability using different metrics for the Z-score. Further, we focus 
on the Russian banking sector which was severely affected by the recent crisis and on the 
listed public banks, to see how the international oil price dynamics and the currency 
depreciation influence their performance. Finally, we test the effect of oil price returns, but 
also the impact of positive/negative shocks in international oil prices. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Data comes from the FactSet database, which initially include 20 listed public banks 
and cover a period from 2005 to 2017 (all data are expressed in US dollars). Out of the 20 
banks, for three banks we have a very small amount of information
6
 and two banks were 
privatized in 2017.
7
 Given that our T is relatively small and we need a rolling window to 
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 For AK Bars Bank data are available starting with 2011, for RBC OJSC there are no data available for a series 
of indicators as liquidity ratio or net interest margins, and severe losses were recorded for the entire period. In 
addition, for the Best Efforts Bank data are available starting with 2014 only. These banks are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
7
 These two banks are Promsvyazbank and Tatfondbank.  
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compute the Z-score and oil price shocks, we have decided to cover the period 2008 to 2016, 
for 17 banks.
8
 Therefore, the banks that were privatized in 2017 are included in the analysis. 
A rolling window of four years is used for the computation of moving means (n  ) for Z-
scores. A higher Z-score is associated with an increased bank stability (the probability for a 
bank to make default decreases). 
The general formula for the Z-score computation is (Albulescu and Ionescu, 2018): 
 -score
t
 
 ARt R At
 R A,t
 ,         (1) 
where AR: represents the capital-to-assets ratio, R A is the return on assets and   the 
standard deviation. 
To compute the Z-score, we first, use the Boyd et al.’s (2006) approach ( 1), which 
relies on the moving means  
 AR,t
(n),  
R A,t
(n) and the standard deviation  R A,t(n), 
calculated for each period t  1   . Therefore, the formula become: 
 1t 
  AR,t  R A,t
 R A,t
 .          (2) 
Second, for robustness purpose, we use the approach of Yeyati and Micco (2007), 
where the moving mean  
R A,t
(n) and the standard deviation  R A,t(n)  are calculated for each 
period t  1   , and are afterwards combined with the current value of  ARt. Therefore, the 
formula for the Z-score ( 2) become: 
  2t 
 ARt  R A,t
 R A,t
 .          (3) 
R A is computed as the ratio between the net income and total assets. While the Z-
score is the dependent variable, the main explanatory variables are represented by the oil 
prices
9
 – wti, by the oil price positive (wti
 
) and negative shocks (wti
-
), and by the price to 
book value ratio (pbvr). 
The oil price shocks for annual data are computed as follows
10
: 
wti
 
 IF(wtit A  RAG (wtit-1 wtit-3));wtit-A  RAG (wtit-1 wtit-3));0). (4) 
wti
-
 IF(wtit A  RAG (wtit-1 wtit-3));wtit-A  RAG (wtit-1 wtit-3));0). (5) 
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 The 17 public banks retained in our sample are: Avangard Joint Stock Bank, Bank Otkritie Financial 
Corporation, Bank St. Petersburg, Bank Zenit, Credit Bank of Moscow, Far East Bank, Gazprombank, Joint 
Stock Commercial Bank Rosbank, Moscovskiy Oblastnoi Bank, OTP Bank, Bank Uralsib, Promsvyazbank, 
Sberbank Russia, Tatfondbank, Vozrozhdenie Bank, VTB Bank and West Siberian Commercial Bank. 
9
 As in Lee and Lee (2018) we use WTI crude oil prices from the Energy Information Administration, expressed 
in log-returns. 
10
 Figure A1 – Appendix shows how shocks spread over time. 
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The control variables first include the bank performances’ dimension and are 
represented by the net interest margins – nim (FactSet), by net operating cash flow – nocf 
(FactSet), by the liquidity ratio – lr (FactSet) computed as the ratio between net loans and 
total deposits showing the maturity match (as in Lee and Lee, 2018) and by the size – ta, 
calculated as the natural log of total assets (FactSet). For all these variables we expect a 
positive influence on bank stability in the short run. The macroeconomic context is 
represented by the GDP growth rate – gdp (World Bank statistics) whereas the banking sector 
competition is assessed through the bank concentration index – bc (World Bank statistics). 
While the economic growth should have a positive influence on the stability level, the effect 
of bank competition is not straightforward (see ‘competition-fragility’ vs. ‘competition-
stability’ theories). Finally, the quality of institutions is represented by the political risk 
associated with the regulatory quality
11
 – r  (World Bank statistics) and by the Corruption 
Perception Index – cpi (Transparency International). A better regulatory framework should 
have a positive impact on bank stability, while the opposite applies for a higher corruption 
level.
12
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The PMG estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) supposes an Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (ARDL) framework, designed for dynamic panel specifications (ARDL 
(p, 
1
, , 
k
)):  
 i,t   i,  i,t-    i, 
  
  0
p
  1  i,t-   i  i,t,      (6) 
where:   is the Z-score, i is the number of groups (banks) and t is the number of periods 
(years),  i,t is the k 1 vector of explanatory variables,  i, 
 
 are coefficients,  i,  are scalars,  i 
are group effects,  i,t is the error term. 
If the variables are I(1), Eq. (6) can be reparametrized into an error correction equation, 
where additional control variables might be introduced (Blackburne and Frank, 2007): 
  i,t  i  i,t- - i
  i,t    i, 
 
  i,t-    i, 
  -1
  0
p-1
  1   i,t-    i, 
  Yi,t- 
 -1
  0   
i
  i,t,  (7) 
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 The Russian banking regulation framework recorded important changes after the banking crisis in 2014. This 
element may also affect the bank stability. We consider that the World Bank indicator assessing the regulatory 
quality capture the effect of the banking regulation reform. 
12
 The methodology used by Transparency International to assess the perception on corruption, associate a high 
value of cpi with a small level of corruption. Therefore, a positive sign for cpi is expected in our regressions. 
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where:  
i
 is the error-correction speed of the adjustment term (which should be negative and 
significantly different from zero to validate the existence of a long-run relationship),  i is the 
vector that explains the long-run relationships between variables, Yi,t is the k 1 vector of 
control variables,  i, 
 
,  i, 
 
 and  
i, 
  are short-run coefficients. 
3.3. General statistics 
 
The summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1, showing a very high 
variability for the net operating cash-flow, but also for the Z-score. Further, the negative oil 
price shocks are higher that the positive ones over the analyzed time span. In addition, the 
bank competition considerably fluctuates over the analyzed period, from a minimum level of 
21.58 to a maximum of 47.45.
13
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 z1 z2 wti wti+ wti- pbvr nim nocf lr ta gdp bc rq cpi 
Mean  22.70  22.17 -0.057  8.273  -11.43  0.798  45.04  43.04  1.148  4.596  1.149  31.66  0.697  2.544 
SD  21.56  20.97  0.323  11.74  18.12  0.420  16.90  141.8  0.309  2.895  4.098  7.988  0.079  0.324 
Min -0.631 -2.182  0.320  34.66   0.000  1.642 -9.549 -36.74  0.452 -0.982 -7.820  47.56  0.773  2.100 
Max  156.5  156.5 -0.650  0.000  -46.40  0.167  82.96  121.5  2.681  10.21  5.284  21.58  0.591  2.900 
Note: z1 – Z-score 1; z2 – Z-score 2; wti – WTI crude oil prices return; wti+ – positive shocks in crude oil prices; wti- – 
negative shocks in crude oil prices; pbvr – price to book value ratio; nim – net interest margins; nocf – net operating cash 
flow; lr – liquidity ratio; ta – natural log of total assets; gdp – economic growth rate; bc – bank concentration; rq – 
regulatory quality; cpi – corruption perception index. 
 
 
We start our empirical analysis with a series of panel unit root tests. To see what 
generation of tests should be applied, we first test the existence of the cross-sectional 
independence hypothesis (Table 2). A priori, given the existence of the interbank market, it is 
hard to accept the independence hypothesis. However, all three tests (Frees, 1995; Friedman, 
1937; Pesaran, 2004) do not reject the null hypothesis, showing that the first generation of 
panel unit root tests, which are more powerful in the presence of cross-sectional 
independence, should be applied. 
 
Table 2. Cross-sectional dependence tests 
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 The correlation matrix (Table A1 – Appendix) shows a high correlation between the two metrics of the Z-
score, namely  1 and  2. A positive correlation appears between bank stability and our interest variables, as 
expected. In addition, bank performances are positively correlated with the Z-score (nocf represents an exception 
and shows a negative correlation with the Z-score). At the same time, it seems that the size is positively 
correlated with Z-score, indicating that larger banks are more stable. Further, bank stability is positively 
correlated with the economic growth, as expected, but also with cpi (a higher cpi is equivalent with a lower 
perception of corruption). The level of correlation of our variables seems, however, reduced (except for the two 
metrics of the Z-score).  
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Cross-sectional dependence tests 
dependent variable Frees (1995) Friedman (1937) Pesaran (2004) 
z1 0.795 13.08 0.417 
z2 0.688 12.73 0.706 
Note: ***,**,* means rejection of the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence at 99%, 95% and 
90% confidence level (equivalent with the existence of cross-sectional dependence). 
The panel unit root tests show mixed evidence (Table 3). While for  1,  2 and liquidity 
ratio, two out of for tests reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit roots, only one test 
rejects the null hypothesis for the other variables. In the case of the regulation quality, bank 
competition and negative oil price shocks, all tests show the presence of unit roots. An 
exception is the gdp, where all tests indicates the presence of a mean reverting process. We 
may conclude that most of our variables are I(1), which recommend the PMG approach for 
estimation. 
 
Table 3. Panel unit root tests 
 Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-stat 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP - Fisher 
Chi-square 
z1 -3.459*** -0.895  41.21  66.75*** 
z2 -4.292*** -1.179  42.68  62.71*** 
wti -0.865 -0.699  34.67  154.2*** 
wti+ -0.771 -0.262  29.26  147.6*** 
wti-  10.18  2.621  7.330  16.25 
pbvr -3.658 -0.829  45.43*  37.46 
nim  0.230  1.563  22.55  46.74* 
nocf  1.503  0.423  39.46  70.84*** 
lr -0.642*** -0.140  38.77  103.1*** 
ta -5.170*** -0.719  42.40  17.68 
gdp -7.728*** -2.196**  55.63**  97.72*** 
bc  5.433  4.571  2.316  14.83 
rq -0.424  2.240  8.907  10.52 
cpi -3.602***  1.794  11.07  9.877 
Notes: (i) the null hypothesis for all the tests is the presence of unit roots (the t* test assumes common unit root process 
while the other tests assume individual unit root process);  
          (ii) *, **, ***, mean stationarity (in level) significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Applying the PMG estimator, we test nine different models. Given the characteristics of 
our sample with a small T and a reduced number of observations, we introduce in the short-
run specification each control variable separately. Consequently, the long-run relationship 
between  , wti and pbvr remains the same for all models. The first model is run without 
control variables (Model 1). Afterwards, in the short-run equation we introduce separately the 
control variables, namely nim (Model 2), nocf (Model 3), lr (Model 4), ta (Model 5), gdp 
(Model 6), bc (Model 7), r  (model 8) and cpi (Model 6). We estimate these models for the oil 
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prices returns – wti (Table 4), for the oil price positive shocks – wti
 
 (Table 5) and for the oil 
price negative shocks – wti
-
 (Table 6). 
The first set of results is presented in Table 4. We may notice that for all models, except 
for Model 4, the long-run relationship between bank stability, oil prices and bank valuation is 
significant. Both an increase in international oil prices and in the value of banks perceived by 
the investors (i.e. share prices) compared to the book value (pbvr), positively influence the 
bank stability. Nevertheless, it seems that the direct, macroeconomic channel that explains the 
oil-bank stability pass-through is more important compared with the financial channel in the 
case of Russian public banks. 
These results are in agreement with those reported by Khandelwal et al. (2016), 
showing that a decline in oil prices leads to an increase in the NPL ratio (that is, the bank 
instability). The adjustment coefficient from the short-run equation ( 
i
) is negative and 
significant in all cases, providing evidence in the favor of a significant long-run relationship. 
However, when we look to the short-run coefficients, we observe that in almost all the cases 
these coefficients are not significant, except for the Model 4, where a positive relationship 
appears in the short run between the liquidity ratio and bank stability. In fact, as Khandelwal 
et al. (2016) emphasize, in the short run the effect of oil prices might be captured by the 
macroeconomic variables (e.g. growth rate), which explain the loss of the significance of oil 
prices coefficients.  
 
Table 4. Results for the oil price returns – main (z1) 
 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti  10.50***  11.48***  15.14***  4.077  17.47***  10.22***  9.832***  13.74***  14.62*** 
pbvr  0.191***  0.195***  0.179***  0.186***  0.194***  0.183***  0.192***  0.196***  0.166*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.797*** -0.911*** -0.819*** -0.947*** -0.720*** -0.729*** -0.782*** -0.808*** -0.751*** 
wti -2.245  11.58 -1.363 -7.405* -2.084  4.016 -3.296 -5.589 -4.431 
pbvr  13.39 -88.69  79.84 -111.7  19.68  158.2  1.367  15.27  217.8 
nim  -0.359        
nocf    -6.548       
lr     23.05**      
ta      6.377     
gdp       0.230    
bc       -0.116   
rq         4.321  
cpi          9.713 
c  7.713  5.041  1.140  13.16*  9.202  12.97*  6.972  6.749  10.87 
Log Likelihood -453.3 -430.3 -421.1 -432.6 -418.3 -429.1 -440.3 -425.6 -423.2 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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In what follows we compare the effect of positive and negative oil price shocks on the 
bank stability. Table 5 shows that wti
 
 have a positive long-run impact on the bank stability, 
in all the cases (again, Model 4 represent an exception).
14
 However, the effect of oil price 
shocks on bank stability is much more reduced compared to the effect of price returns. Notice 
that the approach used for the shocks’ computation allows the propagation of shocks in time. 
Therefore, the effect of a price shock can be recorder over one, two, or even three consecutive 
periods. These findings show that not the shock itself is important for the bank stability, but 
the increase in the oil price associated with a positive shock. It is also interesting to notice the 
sign of wti
 
 in the short-run equation, which is negative. Although these coefficients are not 
significant (Models 4 and 9 represents an exception), they suggest that the short-run impact of 
the shock is negative, result that explains the findings of Adetutu et al. (2019), stating that an 
oil price boom negatively affects the bank performances in Kazakhstan, which similar to 
Russia, represents an oil-exporting country. Indeed, in the short-run, the domestic 
consumption slows down following a sudden increase in oil prices, which in turn negatively 
affects companies’ performances and their capacity to fulfil their financial obligations. 
However, in the long run, the shock is absorbed and, bringing benefits for the Russian 
economy, it contributes to the bank stability by raising the revenues of the state companies 
and ameliorating the fiscal stance.  
 
Table 5. Results for the oil price positive shocks – main (z1) 
 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti+  0.114***  0.112***  0.749*** -0.045  0.187***  0.153***  0.093***  0.142***  2.008*** 
pbvr  0.212***  0.217***  0.109***  0.177***  0.226***  0.218***  0.587***  0.076***  0.099*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.825*** -0.784*** -0.646*** -1.033*** -0.799*** -0.772*** -0.554*** -0.892*** -0.628*** 
wti+ -0.092 -0.338 -0.219 -0.461** -0.084 -0.226  0.118 -0.052 -0.299** 
pbvr -13.58 -30.83  0.838 -28.42  79.52  13.90 -15.83  22.78  97.79 
nim   0.584        
nocf   -5.565       
lr     33.97**      
ta      10.74     
gdp       0.242    
bc        0.111   
rq          7.774**  
cpi          3.528* 
c  6.969 -6.568 -4.671  9.447  7.496  4.917  13.47  10.56*  1.815 
Log Likelihood -457.1 -424.7 -449.0 -426.8 -429.1 -427.0 -430.6 -416.9 -427.1 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
As in the previous case (Table 4), a positive bank valuation (higher price to book ratio) 
contributes to the bank stability. This result shows that positive oil price shocks induce an 
                                                          
14
 The impact of the liquidity ratio might capture the effect of international oil prices. 
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indirect positive effect on the stock market, which contribute to a better bank valuation. 
Different from the previous results, for Models 8 and 9 the coefficient of the control variables 
is significant and have the expected sign, showing that both regulatory quality and a reduced 
perception of corruption favorize the stability of the public banks. 
Table 6 presents the results for negative shocks in oil prices. As expected, the long-run 
impact is negative and significant (except for the Models 4 and 8). The pbvr has a long-run 
positive influence on bank stability, for all tested models. In this case, the economic growth 
rate has a slight influence on the short-run bank stability (Model 6). It appears that in the short 
run, the initially impact of a negative shock is positive (Models 5 and 6). However, in the long 
run, the results clearly show the opposite. 
 
Table 6. Results for the oil price negative shocks – main (z1) 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti- -0.054*** -0.131*** -0.069*** -0.025 -0.227*** -0.147*** -0.059*** -0.040 -0.028*** 
pbvr  0.194***  0.015***  0.188***  0.176***  0.009*  0.035***  0.187***  0.063***  0.068*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.755*** -0.584*** -0.726*** -0.981*** -0.452*** -0.612*** -0.743*** -0.755*** -0.816*** 
wti-  0.098 -0.113  0.101  0.017  0.224**  0.573*  0.255  0.125  0.123 
pbvr  5.397 -56.20  126.1 -22.45 -168.8 -74.32  57.18  6.600  144.4 
nim  -0.374        
nocf   -3.795       
lr     21.52*      
ta      1.523     
gdp       1.053*    
bc        0.504   
rq         6.859*  
cpi          7.120 
c  6.561  4.350  1.225  12.03  7.326*  3.042  6.476  8.040  9.048 
Log Likelihood -460.6 -433.6 -435.1 -424.1 -441.3 -439.6 -443.0 -439.5 -420.1 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
These findings confirms the previous results reported in the literature (e.g. Al-Khazali 
and Mirzaei, 2017; Ibrahim, 2019), providing support for asymmetric effects of oil price 
shocks. However, different from Ibrahim (2019), we show that both positive and negative oil 
price changes influence bank performance. In addition, different from Al-Khazali and Mirzaei 
(2017) we posit that oil price positive shocks have a greater impact on the bank stability 
compared with negative shocks. Long-run expectations related to oil price positive jumps 
might determine banks to increase the loans’ volume in a favorable economic context, which 
allows them to make more profit and to strengthen their financial stability.  
Nevertheless, our estimations might be subject to some caveats given the lack of 
significance for the control variables’ coefficients in the short-run equation for most of the 
tested models, situation that requires additional investigations. Therefore, in the next section 
we perform two different robustness check analyses. First, we use an alternative measure for 
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the Z-score, relying on the Yeyati and Micco’s (2007) approach. Second, we drop from our 
data sample the Sberbank Russia statistics. Sberbank might me considered as an outlier in our 
sample, being the largest bank in the Russian banking sector. Its assets in 2016 represents 
about 50% from the total public bank system. 
 
 
 
 
5. Robustness analysis 
 
5.1. Alternative measure for the Z-score 
 
The robustness results using  2 are presented in Table 7. Similar to the main analysis, 
we document the existence of a long-run relationship between bank stability on the one hand, 
and dynamics of oil prices and bank valuation on the other hand. Both explanatory variables 
positively influence the stability of Russian public banks in the long run. A slight difference 
appears in the case of Models 6 and 8, where the sign of the oil price coefficient is either 
insignificant, or negative. Similar to the main results, in the short run there is no significant 
influence of oil prices on the bank stability, while the coefficients of control variables are not 
significant (except for Model 4). 
 
Table 7. Results for the oil price returns – robustness (z2) 
 
z2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti  5.888*  8.153***  18.40***  1.829  10.93***  3.107  2.653*** -1.791  14.19*** 
pbvr  0.147***  0.159***  0.114***  0.130***  0.147***  0.105***  0.152***  0.107***  0.102*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.773*** -0.897*** -0.793*** -0.893*** -0.684*** -0.660*** -0.741*** -0.716*** -0.937*** 
wti -1.748  9.130 -3.812 -1.489  0.216  4.357 -3.478 -1.296 -13.23 
pbvr  81.76  19.61  183.6 -72.91  45.89  22.58  75.07  81.48  33.05 
nim   0.303        
nocf    -6.091       
lr     31.23***      
ta     -9.482     
gdp      -0.212    
bc       -0.236   
rq        -1.927  
cpi          2.107 
c  7.726  5.558  3.042  14.30*  9.049  12.45** 6.334  6.808  10.88* 
Log Likelihood -463.5 -439.9 -429.7 -432.0 -440.7 -433.0 -438.1 -431.2 -427.7 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The robustness results related to the impact of positive and negative oil price shocks on 
bank stability are presented in Appendix. Table A2 shows that positive shocks have a long run 
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and benefic effect on the bank stability, and confirm thus the main findings. The same applies 
for the effects of negative shocks (Table A3), which contribute to a reduction of the stability 
level in the long run (except for Model 5). The effect of the control variables is practically 
insignificant in the short-run equation. This robustness analysis confirms the previous 
findings, showing the absence of a significant effect of oil price shocks on the bank stability 
in the short run. 
 
 
5.2. Re-sampling results (16 cross-sections) 
 
The second robustness check implies the construction of a new dataset, including 16 
banks, for the same period 2008 to 2016 (these results are presented in Table 8). Although the 
long-run influence of international oil prices seems to be less important if we compare the 
level of coefficients, it remains positive and significant (the significance vanishes in this case 
for Model 8 only). At the same time, the bank positive valuation by investors contribute to 
increasing bank stability in the long run. Nevertheless, in the short run, no significant 
influence is recorded. This evidence confirms the main findings and state that the influence of 
oil prices on bank stability can be documented only in the long run. 
If we now refer to the impact of oil price shocks, Tables A4 and A5 (Appendix) show 
that positive oil price shocks enhance bank stability in the long run (except for Model 8), 
while negative shocks have an opposite effect, as expected. Like in the main analysis, we 
notice that for Models 5 and 6, the short-run impact of a negative shock is positive, being 
associated with a cost reduction for households and companies, which favor the consumption 
and investment. However, in the long run, the results clearly indicate the negative impact in 
international oil price drops, on the Russian public banks stability.  
 
Table 8. Results for the oil price returns – robustness (re-sampling) 
 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti  5.240*  12.53***  17.57*** -40.46  9.890**  14.30**  4.343* -3.711 -9.239* 
pbvr  0.514***  0.098***  0.114***  0.750***  0.423***  0.088***  0.094***  0.076***  0.110*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.573*** -0.861*** -0.712*** -0.660*** -0.564*** -0.632*** -0.691*** -0.759*** -0.692*** 
wti -0.017  13.44 -1.854  4.613  1.425  3.629 -3.701  1.496  3.874 
pbvr  15.99 -91.04  88.47 -15.05 -10.90  16.55  2.204  23.36  16.81 
nim   0.401        
nocf    -6.689       
lr     34.52**      
ta      8.053     
gdp      -0.236    
bc       -0.265   
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rq        -6.310  
cpi          11.23 
c  7.975  5.740 -0.126  15.68*  8.672  12.64**  5.203  7.441  8.562 
Log Likelihood -436.1 -424.1 -414.0 -397.2 -417.4 -417.8 -432.2 -415.6 -409.1 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
In a nutshell, we reinforce the findings by Khandelwal et al. (2016), Al-Khazali and 
Mirzaie (2017) and Ibrahim (2019), reporting a significant and positive effect of oil prices on 
bank stability in Russia. However, different from these previous findings, we show that the oil 
price-bank stability pass-through is only significant in the long run, whereas the positive 
shocks in oil prices have a larger influence on bank stability compared with negative shocks.  
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper adds to the literature investigating the determinants of bank stability, with a 
focus on the role of international oil prices. For this purpose, complementary to previous 
works we exploit two channels throughout the oil prices dynamics may influence the bank 
stability, namely the macroeconomic and the financial market channel. Different from 
previous studies on the subject, we test not only the influence of international oil price returns, 
but also the effect of positive and negative shocks in oil prices, on the bank stability. 
To this end, we use a PMG estimator for a sample of 17 listed public banks from 
Russia, for the period 2008 to 2016. We show that both international oil prices and price to 
book value ratio have a positive impact on bank stability. Our results are in line with those 
reported by Husain et al. (2015) and Al-Khazali and Mirzaei (2017) which use a different 
proxy for the bank stability in oil-exporting countries. Nevertheless, our findings bring 
additional insights to the literature, showing that oil price shocks have a different impact on 
the stability in the short run, compared to the long run. Further, our results state that not only 
the macroeconomic, direct channel is important for oil price pass-through bank stability, but 
also the indirect, financial channel. These findings are supported by the robustness analyses 
we perform and show, once again, the importance of the oil prices volatility for the Russian 
economy. The findings clearly underline the positive long run effect of an increase in 
international oil price on bank stability in an oil-exporting country. 
Two policy implications result from our investigation. First, it is important to 
disentangle between the short-run and long-run effects of international oil prices on bank 
stability. Positive oil price shocks may contribute to better bank performances in the long run, 
while having an opposite effect in the short run. The same applies for the negative shocks, 
although the short run influence is rather insignificant. Second, the authorities from oil-
exporting countries should be aware by the fact that a positive oil production shock generate a 
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negative oil price shock on the international market, with a negative influence on the domestic 
banking sector stability. Therefore, it is recommended to control the production, to obtain a 
smooth increase of international oil prices. This strategy helps the authorities to safeguard the 
public bank stability and, given the importance of public banks for the Russian financial 
sector, the stability of the entire financial system. The control of oil production by the Russian 
authorities is possible given the higher concentration of this sector, where the state-own 
company Rosneft accounts for nearly half of Russia’s oil production (Simola and Solnnko, 
2017). However, the Russian authorities did not tried to influence the international oil prices 
after 2014 by reducing the oil production. 
Our results should be, however, interpreted with caution, and require additional 
investigations. On the one hand, in the short run, the control variables we use do not explain 
the level bank stability and are rather insignificant. On the other hand, our sample is relatively 
small, and do not allow the comparation between oil price effect on public and private banks. 
Finally, constrained by the length of our data sample, we use a linear framework, for a period 
characterized by important economic events for the economy of Russia.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Oil price shocks 
  
(a) Positive shocks (b) Negative shocks 
Note: Hamilton’s (2003) approach is designed to compute positive shocks only. 
 
Table A1. Correlation matrix 
 z1 z2 wti wti+ wti- pbvr nim nocf lr ta gdp bc rq cpi 
z1  1.000              
z2  0.990  1.000             
wti  0.286  0.284  1.000            
wti+  0.133  0.122  0.061  1.000           
wti- -0.092 -0.077 -0.072 -0.049  1.000          
pbvr  0.250  0.240  0.020  0.044 -0.026  1.000         
nim  0.117  0.146  0.277  0.246  0.326 -0.013  1.000        
nocf -0.018 -0.015 -0.051 -0.088  0.096 -0.058  0.151  1.000       
lr  0.200  0.275  0.207  0.349  0.192  0.130 -0.121 -0.017  1.000      
ta  0.101  0.089 -0.034 -0.062 -0.052  0.237  0.149  0.490  0.131  1.000     
gdp  0.129  0.120  0.902  0.615 -0.624  0.004  0.252 -0.046  0.152  0.008  1.000    
bc -0.217 -0.216 -0.634 -0.633 -0.907  0.060 -0.325  0.115 -0.246  0.088 -0.456  1.000   
rq  0.052  0.062  0330  0.470  0.533 -0.078  0.229 -0.122  0.128 -0.106  0.256 -0.759  1.000  
cpi  0.011  0.012 -0.391 -0.374  0.048  0.095 -0.183  0.119 -0.168  0.116 -0.166  0.715 -0.869  1.000 
Note: z1 – Z-score 1; z2 – Z-score 2; wti – WTI crude oil prices return; wti+ – positive shocks in crude oil prices; wti- – 
negative shocks in crude oil prices; pbvr – price to book value ratio; nim – net interest margins; nocf – net operating cash 
flow; lr – liquidity ratio; ta – natural log of total assets; gdp – economic growth rate; bc – bank concentration; rq – 
regulatory quality; cpi – corruption perception index. 
 
Table A2. Results for the oil price positive shocks – robustness (z2) 
z2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti+  0.718***  1.205***  0.165*** -0.202***  0.742***  0.685***  0.041  0.004  0.774*** 
pbvr  0.166***  0.263***  0.132***  0.095***  0.174***  0.145***  0.147***  0.093***  0.190*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.597*** -0.425*** -0.826*** -0.924*** -0.570*** -0.529*** -0.760*** -0.779*** -0.699*** 
wti+ -0.146 -0.468** -0.185 -0.418** -0.066 -0.385* -0.239 -0.084 -0.148 
pbvr  33.39  15.61  93.68  50.03  24.20  51.60  89.35  77.64  16.70 
nim   0.442        
nocf   -5.467       
lr     39.32***      
ta     -6.190     
gdp       0.470    
bc        0.430   
rq         3.971  
cpi          1.488 
c  2.636 -10.58 -1.075  12.15  4.843  0.415 -0.030  8.077  3.924 
Log Likelihood -460.2 -443.3 -446.0 -428.7 -433.1 -434.0 -436.1 -422.7 -400.8 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table A3. Results for the oil price negative shocks – robustness (z2) 
 
z2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti- -0.026 -0.064*** -0.309*** -0.082***  0.432*** -440.8***  0.014*** -0.028* -0.008 
pbvr  0.154***  0.164***  0.100***  0.132***  0.202***  0.030***  0.141***  0.075***  0.204 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.728*** -0.662*** -0.855*** -0.955*** -0.488* -0.591*** -0.708*** -0.665*** -0.467* 
wti-  0.077 -0.312 -0.059  0.012 -0.017  0.510  0.081  0.082  0.141 
pbvr  77.56  6.740  32.19 -16.07 -37.16 -3.759  129.8  66.46  27.61 
nim   0.213        
nocf   -0.761       
lr     24.21**      
ta      1.649     
gdp       0.997*    
bc        0.271   
rq        -3.866  
cpi          22.71 
c  6.352  0.827  7.436  11.84  7.440  3.745  6.328  6.994  9.364 
Log Likelihood -460.3 -432.5 -424.3 -428.7 -416.3 -440.8 -427.6 -425.5 -419.2 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Table A4. Results for the oil price positive shocks – robustness (re-sampling) 
 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti+  0.668***  0.699***  0.776***  0.579***  0.181**  0.150*** -0.537*** -0.144  2.230*** 
pbvr  0.123***  0.127***  0.104***  0.179***  0.418***  0.113***  0.092***  0.076***  0.100*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.643*** -0.570*** -0.607*** -0.675*** -0.649*** -0.675*** -0.513*** -0.818*** -0.592*** 
wti+ -0.182* -0.439** -0.240 -0.451* -0.057 -0.271 -0.355 -0.054 -0.301** 
pbvr -37.05  28.63  2.096 -52.55  84.56  15.48  95.64  24.54  110.0 
nim   0.560        
nocf    -5.699       
lr     29.77*      
ta      11.57     
gdp       0.267    
bc       -1.071*   
rq         8.164**  
cpi          -3.583* 
c  2.603 -6.706 -5.952  4.082  7.372  3.079 -5.549  8.742  1.808* 
Log Likelihood -436.3 -426.3 -423.2 -404.7 -413.6 -4.13.5 -418.3 -393.5 -403.5 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Table A5. Results for the oil price negative shocks – robustness (re-sampling) 
 
z1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Long- 
run 
wti-  0.024 -0.131***  0.031 -0.061* -0.227*** -0.155***  0.519*** -0.061** -0.028*** 
pbvr  0.081***  0.015***  0.077***  0.732***  0.009  0.035***  0.079***  0.050***  0.066*** 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Short- 
run 
 
i
 -0.710*** -0.537*** -0.638*** -0.758*** -0.389** -0.555*** -0.671*** -0.700*** -0.751*** 
wti-  0.128 -0.135  0.116 -0.062  0.227**  0.599* -0.022  0.143  0.131 
pbvr  4.764 -59.68  13.53 -22.35 -17.93 -77.70  49.08  6.558  15.33 
nim   0.370        
nocf    -5.637       
lr     22.49      
ta      0.151     
gdp       1.111*    
bc        0.057   
rq         7.656*  
cpi          8.462 
c  6.276  3.020 -0.110  17.93*  6.255  1.310  11.48*  7.267  7.464 
Log Likelihood -444.2 -408.1 -414.7 -411.2 -415.1 -413.8 -422.8 -415.0 -397.5 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
